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The purpose of this study is to explore factors of the educational effect of the supply 
chain management (SCM) game. This study focuses on a beneficent influential point 
in SCM from prior research and the effects these points have on supply chain (SC) 
experts as SCM game players. For the statistical analysis, this study uses the game 
results of a new online SCM game named the “elephant game.” The results show that 
knowledge sharing between SC nodes not only reduces the bullwhip effect and total 
inventory cost but also changes the opinions of SC experts. Miscalculations of lead 
time and the existence of strategy also change their minds. Thus, this research finds 
important learning factors for SC experts in the SCM game. The results indicate the 
potential for the elephant game to be an education tool for SC experts and future SCM 
research. 
Keywords: Supply chain management, simulation game, inter-organizational learning 
 
Introduction 
Prior supply chain management (SCM) researchers have been interested in an optimized solution for 
the supply chain (SC). Unfortunately, there are few best solutions because of the complexity of SCs (Lee 
et al. 1997). Therefore, we consider that the optimized solution takes on different forms, depending on 
the SC. This idea is the foundation of our research, and reveals the process of finding the optimized 
solution in the SC. 
The SC is defined as a set of three or more entities (organizations or individuals) directly involved in the 
upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances, and/or information from a source to a 
customer (Mentzer et al. 2001). Based on this definition, SCM exists to synchronize the requirements 
of customers with the flow of materials from suppliers in order to ensure a balance between what are 
often considered the conflicting goals of high customer service, low inventory management, and low 
unit cost (Stevens 1989). 
One of the key concepts of optimized solutions for proper inventory in the SC is reducing the bullwhip 
effect (BWE) in the SC (Lee et al. 1997). The BWE is the phenomenon in which orders to suppliers tend 
to have larger variance than do sales to buyers, and the distortion propagates upstream in an amplified 
form (Lee et al. 1997). The BWE causes order variation in the upper stream node, for example, a 
manufacturer might show significant variability compared to a retailer. The organizations in SC are 
called nodes with k. In this research, a customer is represented by k = 0, a retailer by k = 1, a distributer 
by k = 2, and a manufacturer by k = 3.  
The source of the motivation of SCM is the elimination of barriers between trading partners to promote 
information sharing between nodes (Gilbert and Ballou 1999). Prior research points out that 
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information and knowledge sharing in the SC is an important key factor for reducing the BWE (Lee et 
al. 1997). Information flows, such as order information in the SC, have direct power to plan management 
strategy, forecast the market, and schedule delivery of a product to the customer in each organization. 
As a result, information flows are accompanied by knowledge generated from sharing information and 
discussion between nodes in the SC. Furthermore, information sharing, such as forecasting a market 
order, allows for organizational coordination in the SC. Active cooperation in the SC acts as a stimulus 
for the generation of SCM and SC organizations become united.  
This research focuses on information, knowledge sharing, and management strategy in order to reduce 
the BWE in the SC. For this reason, this research requires data comprising real SC information, but in 
the real world of business, an organization belongs to multiple SCs. For example, AEON, one of the 
biggest shopping mall chains in Japan, has a wide variety of goods, such as food, clothing, electronics 
devices, and books. SC data are cross-organizational and cannot be disclosed; therefore, it is difficult to 
obtain data for our research. 
Thus, this research uses a new online SCM game to collect simulation data. We develop a cross-platform 
online SCM game, named the “elephant game.” In contrast to previously developed business games, this 
game is accessible through mobile devices, such as smartphones. The new SCM game has been used at 
two universities, and by more than 100 business people working in consulting firms and the SCM field. 
This study demonstrates important factors that promote the positive effect on SCM noted from prior 
research, of the educational effect of the SCM game, especially among SC experts. How do they gain 
new understanding of the SCM game? We focused on an SCM strategy based on lead time, BWE, and 
knowledge sharing. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next sections, this study describes the theory and 
hypotheses, the elephant game and data, and the statistical results of the game. Finally, we present 
conclusions. The results show not only the educational effect of the SCM game but also the theoretical 
and practical effects of the elephant game. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Strategic Collaboration in Supply Chain Management 
The definition of SCM is “a set of approaches utilized to efficiently integrate suppliers, manufacturers, 
warehouses, and stores, so that merchandise is produced and distributed at the right quantities, to the 
right locations, and at the right time, in order to minimize system wide costs while satisfying service 
level requirements” (Simchi-Levi, Simchi-Levi, and Watson 2004). The network structures of an SC are 
extremely complicated. Furthermore, lead time adds to the time taken for shipping products to arrive. 
Thus, the manager of production and logistics often knows only the direct business partner, because 
most firms might not be able to manage their SCs owing to the lack of a full picture of the SC. 
Furthermore, the turbulence of the business environment requires new challenges, such as the 
diversification of customer needs and globalization of production and logistics. For example, customer 
demand for improved scheduling costs, and higher quality has been growing year on year. Thus, firms 
have been seeking ways to manage SCs in intricate networks of firms and departments. These factors 
not only will be a core concern of production management in the future, but also will greatly influence 
firms’ entire businesses.  
Mentzer et al. (2001) categorize three degrees of SC depending on complexity: a “direct supply chain,” 
an “extended supply chain,” and an “ultimate supply chain.” A direct SC consists of a company, a 
supplier, and a customer involved in the upstream and/or downstream flows of products, services, 
finances, and/or information. An extended SC includes an immediate supplier and customers with the 
upstream and/or downstream flows of products, services, finances, and/or information. An ultimate SC 
includes all the organizations involved in all the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, 
finances, and information from the ultimate supplier to the ultimate customer (Mentzer et al. 2001).  
Although the easiest way for SCM is to maintain the stability of customers and demand for profitability, 
in reality, the SC environment has various effects on SCM and firm networks are very complicated, 
thereby making it significantly difficult to control the SC. One of the major reasons is the BWE. 
Numerous studies have focused on demonstrating the existence of the BWE, identifying its possible 
causes, and providing methods to reduce its impacts (Chen et al. 2000). Forrester (1958) is the first to 
explore the BWE, and generally focuses on demand variance escalation, but the BWE was not used 
thereafter for 2 decades (Chatfield and Pritchard 2013). Since 1980, there has been a lot of research 
about the BWE, such as studies on simulation, control engineering, and behavior approach (Chatfield 
and Pritchard 2013).  
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In the business area, to solve problems about SC complexity, firms have attempted to form strategic 
alliances about the SCM, such as vendor-managed inventory (VMI), third-party logistics (3PL); 
collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment (CPFR); and sales and operation planning 
(S&OP). VMI is an alliance relationship model developed by Wal-Mart Stores and Procter & Gamble in 
1985. In this model, the vendor takes full responsibility for maintaining the buyer’s inventory. VMI 
contributes significantly to on-time delivery and the inventory turnover rate at Procter & Gamble 
(Simchi-Levi et al. 1999). Disney et al. (2003) analyze the impact of transportation batching within VMI, 
and the result indicates that it is possible for VMI to reduce the BWE. Currently, many leading global 
companies have adopted this model. 3PL is a service in which client companies outsource their logistics 
operations to external logistics companies. Like VMI, 3PL was developed in the 1980s and a growing 
number of companies have used this service recently (Simchi-Levi et al. 1999). The concept of CPFR 
involves SC collaboration between a manufacturer and a retailer in the replenishment planning of the 
retailer’s inventories to optimize the entire SC inventories (Lapide 2010). Finally, S&OP is a traditional 
concept of production management (Vollmann et al. 2005). It has attracted attention recently because 
of the rapid growth of firms, such as Samsung, the Korean electronics company. 
Organizational Learning in the Supply Chain 
This research extends the focus from information sharing to knowledge sharing. Information has very 
few ambiguities from data, while knowledge interprets information and beliefs about cause–effect 
relationships, or, more generally, know-how (Huber 1991). This research highlights that information 
sharing in an SC always faces challenges and difficulties; however, information sharing promotes 
knowledge sharing and the establishment of a new routine between organizations in an SC. It is quite 
usual for downstream organizations in an SC not to provide information, such as market forecasts 
(Fawcett et al. 2010; Smith and Mentzer 2010). At the other extreme, Eroglu and Knemeyer (2010) 
indicate that information disclosure in an SC as information sharing encourages decision making 
through forecasts. 
Huber (1991) shows that the organizational learning process is a typical framework of knowledge 
management. The process consists of several sub-processes: knowledge acquisition, information 
distribution, information interpretation, and organizational memory as a routine. The repetition of the 
cycle promotes continuous change of organizational memory. Huber (1991) defines the various 
processes in organizational learning as follows. 
“Knowledge acquisition is the process by which knowledge is obtained. Information distribution is the 
process by which information from different sources is shared and thereby leads to new information 
or understanding. Information interpretation is the process by which distributed information is given 
one or more commonly understood interpretations. Organizational memory is the means by which 
knowledge is stored for future use” (Huber 1991: 90). 
There are two levels of organization learning in an SC—first, intra-organizational learning, which is 
knowledge sharing in the SC nodes, and second, inter-organizational learning, which is knowledge 
sharing between the SC nodes. This research considers that information disclosure in an SC promotes 
intra-organizational learning through decision making, and communication and discussion between 
organizations promote inter-organizational learning. It is difficult to observe inter-organizational 
learning in real life because of the level of confidentiality involved. However, using our SCM game, intra- 
and inter-organizational learning mechanisms can be observed easily in a simulation game. This 
capability is of considerable significance because it allows the player to repeat the process of trial and 
error as many times as he or she wants, and it is helpful for an inquiry into future SCMs, such as VMI, 
3PL, CPFR, and S&OP. 
Knowledge Sharing in the Supply Chain 
As mentioned in the theory section above, lead time, BWE, unpredictable market, and collaboration 
with different organizations are important factors in the difficulties associated with finding optimized 
solutions for SCM. Therefore, prior research has been searching for solutions to these problems. Several 
studies have noted that information sharing in the SC is an important solution (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2009; 
Breitzman et al. 2002; Chen 2003; Lee et al. 1997).  
It is more difficult for the upstream node, such as manufacturers, to capture unpredictable market 
demand than it is for the downstream node, such as retailers. The companies within the upstream mode 
guess market demand from immediate order requests from the downstream node, such as distributers 
for manufacturers. However, order requests provide distorted information about the BWE and lead 
time. That is one of the main reasons for creating strategic alliances in the SC. 
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Chen et al. (2000) and Lee et al. (2000) prove that centralized information of market demand reduces 
BWE. The order from downstream node includes variable information and this information affects 
production and inventory decisions in the upstream node (Chen 2003). However, the order to the 
upstream node tends to be distorted and can misguide the decisions of participants in the upstream 
node because of the BWE. Mathematically, sharing of market demand information reduces the 
variability of demand forecasts after the second stage in the SC. In addition, the lower forecasting 
variability reduces the variability of order amounts. Thus, in the SCM research discipline, thousands of 
studies have accumulated based on the premise of the positive effects of information sharing on the SC. 
For example, Chen (2003) finds benefits of information in SC mathematically and suggests four types 
of countermeasures against BWE: demand signaling, such as lead time reduction or accessing point-of-
sales data, order batching, like electronic data interchange or regular delivery appointment, fluctuating 
prices, like special purchase contracts, and shortage game, like shared capacity and supply information.  
This research considers that the four types information sharing of Chen (2003) include knowledge 
sharing. This is because all nodes utilize information from other nodes for production and inventory 
decision making. Making decisions requires not only outside information but also knowledge pooling 
in organizational memory. This means that each node puts new acquisition information into 
organizational memory as knowledge through organizational learning processes, as explained by Huber 
(1991). The knowledge includes information and organizational actions and the results. In this 
organizational learning progress, ultimately, the SC might create shared organizational memory in the 
SC. Thus, this research proposes the following Hypothesis 1. 
H1 Knowledge sharing between the supply chain nodes reduces the supply chain’s 
bullwhip effect. 
Educational Effect of Supply Chain Management Game 
As explained earlier in this section, despite the efforts of researchers and firms, there is still no optimal 
path for SCM. Under these conditions, it is difficult for beginners to understand SC and SCM. On the 
other hand, experts also do not know the exact solutions for SCM. Thus, an SCM game has the potential 
for beginners to understand the SC and SCM through virtual experience, and experts can deeply analyze 
and simulate players’ strategies for SCM through the game. Moreover, experts can safely explore players’ 
solutions through a trial-and-error process. 
Indeed, several SCM games have been developed and utilized in educational programs for both students 
and businesspeople. Representative examples are the MIT Beer Game, which is the most widely used 
role-playing simulation board game for demonstrating the BWE under an informational blockade 
between SC nodes. In the beer game, participants play for a long run of about 50 periods over the course 
of 1 day. In addition, it is guaranteed that there will be a clear BWE after the game. In the United States, 
the game is widely used in the classroom and is an icebreaker in executive training courses. There are 
other SCM games that use computers, such as the fresh connection game (Bendoly et al. 2015) and the 
score model game (Webb et al. 2014). Normally, it is necessary for participants of the game used during 
training to understand the SC mechanism and simulated experience of SCM. Generally, while the rules 
are simple, a short game with a quick start is required, and the game should simulate reality. These 
points are extremely difficult to achieve, especially for use by SC experts and specialists, because they 
already have fundamental knowledge about SC and SCM. 
This research explores the key factors behind the educational effect of experts or specialists of SC and 
provides new understanding of the SCM game. For solving these questions, this research focused SCM 
strategy based on lead time, BWE, and knowledge sharing. We consider that if players can simulate 
their strategies using trial and error to check the effectiveness of their strategies, they would feel that 
they are benefiting from the game. In a trial-and-error process, players need to recognize the major 
factor of error and success. As we have discussed, much prior research provides plenty of clues to solve 
these problems. 
One of the major errors is miscalculation of lead time and incoming orders. In real SCs, not all firms 
collaborate with other node firms, and many firms use computer systems to control inventory 
management. For this reason, some experts do not find it necessary to calculate lead time and incoming 
orders in day-to-day tasks and not infrequently, real SCs are too complex to calculate these values. 
Through the game, players face such challenges and realize that covert issues, such as knowledge 
sharing, are essential. Thus, we propose the following Hypotheses 2-1 and 2-2. 
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H2-1 Miscalculation of lead time promotes changes in attitudes about an important factor 
in the supply chain’s proper inventory of participants’ beliefs in the supply chain 
management game. 
H2-2 Miscalculation of an incoming order promotes changes in attitudes about an 
important factor in the supply chain’s proper inventory of participants’ beliefs in 
the supply chain management game. 
The existence of clear strategy with trial-and-error processes is difficult to emulate in real SCM, and 
thus, there is something for experts to learn. In addition, through trial-and-error processes in the game, 
it is important to notice an improvement of inventory costs and the BWE. Thus, we propose the 
following Hypotheses 3-1, 3-2, and 4. 
H3-1 The existence of strategy in the game promotes changes in attitudes about an 
important factor in the supply chain’s proper inventory of participants’ beliefs in 
the supply chain management game. 
H3-2 A proposal to redesign strategy of the supply chain promotes changes in attitudes 
about an important factor in the supply chain’s proper inventory of participants’ 
beliefs in the supply chain management game. 
H4    Reducing the supply chain’s total inventory costs and the bullwhip effect promotes 
changes in attitudes about an important factor in the supply chain’s proper 
inventory of participants’ beliefs in the supply chain management game. 
Introduction of Elephant Game 
Comparison of Prior Supply Chain Management Game with Elephant Game 
Several SCM games have been developed and utilized in educational programs for both students and 
businesspeople. A typical one is the MIT beer game, which is the most widely used role-playing 
simulation game for demonstrating the BWE under an informational blockade between organizations 
in an SC. The BWE is essentially a phenomenon of demand variability amplification along an SC (Lee 
et al. 2000). The BWE is one of the most difficult issues in SCM. In the beer game, participants are 
advised to play for a long time, comprising about 50 periods, after which the players are almost 
guaranteed to observe well-formed bullwhip curves as the result of the game. In the United States, the 
game is widely used, not only in classroom exercises, but also as an icebreaker in executive training 
courses.  
The biggest difference between these existing SCM games and our new game is the ease of playing it. In 
contrast to existing business games, ours is accessible through mobile devices, such as smartphones. In 
addition, because the game’s scenario and architecture are very simple, players can understand the 
game’s mechanism easily. For these reasons, our new SCM game can be played in both small and large 
classes, unlike traditional SCM games, which can usually be played only in small groups in workshops 
or computer rooms. 









Initial stock :  56
Shipping  volume :  41
[Results of 11st  period]
Receipt order:  41
On hand stock:  0
Holding cost:  0




Figure 1. Game screen (left: order form, right: timeline) 
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The game rules are very simple. The SC includes three nodes in the game at three levels consisting of a 
retailer team, a distributor team, and a manufacturer team. All players belong to any one of these teams, 
and each team consists of a only a few players, who interact with each other during the game. Every 
team orders or manufactures products, and a player moves products from the manufacturer to the 
retailer through the distributor with consideration for lead time, and also competes for an appropriate 
amount of inventory. The game can set the holding cost, opportunity cost, and lead time for each team. 
The administrator, who is the instructor, pre-registers the orders (0–100) from the market through a 
simple comma-separated values file uploaded to the game system. In the game, players enter only their 
orders (Figure 1, left) between 0 and 100. 
The game uses the concept of a period, during which a player enters an order only once. For example, if 
the lead time of a retailer is two periods, when the retailer orders the product from the distributer in 
period 10, the product is delivered to the retailer in period 12. The administrator can check the status of 
entries through the administrator’s own monitor, so that when all players finish their order entries, the 
administrator closes the period and moves on to the next period (closing period). After the closing 
period, the result is calculated, and the results automatically show the team’s stock amount, holding 
cost, and opportunity cost on the timeline (Figure 1, right). The player determines the next order based 
on these pieces of information to minimize the total inventory cost. 
Almost all game participants in this study are experts on SCM. A number of participants finished a 6-
month adult education course, the “Strategic SCM course,” at the Tokyo Institute of Technology (the 
certification authority of the course has since changed from the Tokyo Institute of Technology to the 
Japan Institute of Logistics Systems). To undertake the course, applicants were required to have work 
experience in SC or business information systems. 
This research prepares two scenarios depending on the participants’ knowledge-sharing type, that is, a 
closed knowledge-sharing game and an open knowledge-sharing game. In the closed knowledge-
sharing game, players can experience intra-knowledge sharing. The game rule prohibits any knowledge 
sharing with other teams and requires a team to minimize its cost. Participants determine the order 
quantity to minimize their team total inventory cost regardless of the entire SC’s cost. Naturally, if the 
stock amount were to decrease, the teams would order large quantities, and if the stock amount were to 
increase, the teams would reduce their orders significantly. Therefore, most teams attempted to reduce 
stocks to close to zero. Predictably, the BWE occurred in all teams from the game result. As an example, 
we show the transition of the order quantity for some SC in Figure 2a.  
The open knowledge-sharing game permits knowledge sharing between SC nodes for participants with 
experience of inter-knowledge sharing and requires SC groups to play against each other with the aim 
of minimizing their own SC costs. Participants determined the order quantity to minimize the group’s 
total inventory cost, that is, they had to optimize the entire SC cost. Figure 2b shows the transition in 
the order quantities of the teams in the same SC as in Figure 2a. Compared with Figure 2a, Figure 2b 
shows that the variability of the order quantities is precisely controlled. However, a few groups could 
not control the BWE in spite of active discussion among the teams. 
Advantage of the Elephant Game 
We improve the web application of the elephant game based on requests about game subjects from 
business people. At first, minimal functions are mounted on the application for our undergraduate 
students. They are the functions of order submission, inventory cost calculation, state update, and 
status display. A graphic display function is added to the second version to encourage lively discussion 
among game participants. Then, the latest version has a dashboard and sales calculation function, which 
are much-needed functions by the game subjects, that is, business people. Until the second version was 
introduced, players had to trace their status, such as order history and transition of stock amount on 
their timeline. In the updated version, players can know their entire status and performance on their 
dashboard tab at one glance. Through our gaming simulation, participants felt stressed by the 
unavailability of scattered information and thus, we confidently conclude that information should be 
summarized briefly at one site. 
Data and Analysis 
This research uses 114 game result data from two game results of 57 SCM experts in four lecture 
meetings. The data include 11 SCs and 31 teams. Normally, there are 33 teams, but some participants 
did not answer some questions partially. Most teams have two or three players. Each participant played 
more than three games in one lecture meeting. The analysis employs the final game of closed knowledge 
sharing and open knowledge sharing. All participants answered three questionnaires (before the game, 
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after the closed knowledge-sharing game, and after the open knowledge-sharing game). Therefore, the 
game data are combined with questionnaires. In all games, the holding costs 150 yen for the retailer, 
100 yen for the distributor, and 50 yen for the manufacturer. The opportunity cost is 50 yen for the 
retailer, 100 yen for the distributor, and 150 yen for the manufacturer.  
In the closed knowledge-sharing game, the procurement lead time comprised two periods for the 
retailer, the distributor, and the manufacturer. The goal of the closed knowledge-sharing game is 
minimization of the team total inventory cost. Therefore, their lead times are the same as those of all 
teams in the interests of fairness. In the open knowledge-sharing game, the procurement lead time was 
one period for the retailer, two periods for the distributor, and one period for the manufacturer. The 
goal of the open knowledge-sharing game is the minimization of the groups’ total inventory cost.  
The analysis includes two steps. First, the analysis reports the outline of the game result. Second, the 
statistical analysis is reported. To compare closed knowledge sharing with open knowledge sharing 
between total inventory cost and the BWE, we use the Wilcoxon (1945) non-parametric signed-rank test, 
which tests whether the two distributions are the same. After the analysis, to find the factor for changing 
one’s attitude to the game, the analysis employs random-effects logit models. The data consist of two-
panel data: the first panel comprises the results of the closed knowledge-sharing game and the second 
panel those of the open knowledge-sharing game. 
Variables in Statistical Analysis 
The dependent variable is changing opinion; the analysis creates a changing opinion dummy from the 
questionnaire when participants answer before the start of the game and after the open knowledge-
sharing game. The questionnaire asks participants “What do you think about the most important factor 
for proper inventory cost? Please select one. 1. Holding cost, 2. Opportunity cost, and 3. To balance both 
holding cost and opportunity cost.” The questionnaire asks the same questions both times. If the 
participants change their opinions after the open knowledge-sharing game, then the changing opinion 
dummy is 1, and otherwise 0. 
The independent variables are the numbers of mistakes in the game, the strategy existence level, the 
proposal to redesign the strategy level, the SC’s total inventory costs, and the SC’s BWE. Total inventory 
costs are the total amount of inventory cost in all periods divided by the number of periods in the game. 
This is because each game has different periods, owing to the time restriction in the lecture meetings. 
The numbers of mistakes in the game consist of two variables: The number of miscalculations about 
lead time and incoming orders. The number of miscalculations about lead time is taken from the 
question “How many times did you miscalculate the lead time in the team (or SC)?” The number of 
miscalculations about the incoming order is taken from the question “How many times did you 
miscalculate the incoming order in the team (or SC)?”  
The strategy existence-level variable is created from the questionnaire. After the closed knowledge-
sharing game, participants were asked in the questionnaire “Did a game strategy exist in your team?” 
and after the open knowledge-sharing game were asked “Did a game strategy exist in your SC?” The 
available choices were from the following three levels: 1. nothing, 2. vaguely exist, and 3. exist. The 
variable is 0 when the answer is nothing, the variable is 1 when the answer is vaguely exist, and 2 when 
the answer is that a strategy exists.  
The proposal to redesign the strategy-level variable is also created from the questionnaire. The question 
is “Did you suggest a redesigned strategic plan?” and the available choices are the following five levels: 
nothing, twice, sometimes, almost always, and all of the time. The variable is 0 when the answer is 
nothing, and 1 when the answer is twice, and so on.  
The analysis expresses the SC’s BWE, where (1) is the standard deviation of the team’s BWEs and is 
based on Chen et al. (2000). (2) is created to capture the entire BWE in the SC in one variable. 
This research controls team type, the role of the participants in the game, and the degree of enjoyment 
of the participants. The team type of participants is 1 (retailer), 2 (distributor), and 3 (manufacturer). 
The number of team types grows bigger as participants move upstream in the SC. The role of the 
participants in the game is to forge a convergence of opinion level, as depicted by the following variable. 
The variable is from the question “Did you forge a convergence of opinion?” and the available choices 
are from five levels: o (low) to 4 (high). The degree of enjoyment of the participants is measured by an 
interest-level variable, which is developed from the question “Do you think the game is interesting?” 
with the available choices being from among the following five options: nothing, twice, sometimes, 
almost always, and all of the time. The variable is 0 when the answer is nothing, 1 when the answer is 
twice, and so on.   
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Finally, all variables without dummy variables are standardized. After standardization, absolute 
minimum values + 0.1 are added to each variable to avoid 0.   
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𝐵𝐵 = �𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉[𝑏𝑏1,･･･ ,𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘]  = �1𝑘𝑘∑ (𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘 − (1𝑘𝑘 (∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 )))𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1                        (2) 
ｂ: Team’s BWE.     Var [ ]: 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉.        k: a number of nodes in SC.   q: Amount of order.   
d: Amount of market demand.                 t: Game period.                      B: SC’s BWE.          
Results 
Outline of Game Result 
  
Figure 2a. BWE in the closed  
knowledge-sharing game 
Figure 2b. BWE in the open  
knowledge-sharing game 
Figure 2a shows the game result of one SC in the closed knowledge-sharing game. Figure 2b shows the 
game result of the open knowledge-sharing game for the same SC as in Figure 2a. Compared with Figure 
2a, Figure 2b shows that the variability of the order quantities can be controlled precisely. Most SCs go 
through the same motions as depicted in Figures 2a and 2b. However, a few groups could not control 
the BWE in spite of active discussion among the teams. 
In general, knowledge sharing makes people change their attitudes to the game. We investigated what 
effect knowledge sharing had on the strategy by three questionnaires (before the game, after the closed 
knowledge-sharing game, and after the open knowledge-sharing game). Two major tendencies stand 
out from the analysis of the questionnaires (summarized here without detail owing to space constraints). 
First, many participants who had had no or little strategy in their closed knowledge-sharing games had 
precise strategy in their open knowledge-sharing game. For example, in the open knowledge-sharing 
game, a typical strategy is the receipt of order forecasts, which reduces the holding cost or the 
opportunity cost, depending on their configuration of the cost. For example, the holding cost of the 
retailer is 150 yen but the opportunity cost is 50 yen. For these reasons, the retailer attempts to reduce 
the holding cost. Based on similar considerations, the manufacturer attempts to reduce the opportunity 
cost. 
Second, in the closed knowledge-sharing game, every player tends to focus significantly on demand 
forecasting. Based on the forecasting, they respond sensitively to each inventory cost. On the other hand, 
in the open knowledge-sharing game, they tend to focus on ordering adjustment and negotiations about 
risk taking among SCs. Moreover, in the open knowledge-sharing game, we often witness cases in which 
the connection of retailers and distributers was stronger than between manufacturers and 
retailers/distributors. In these cases, although retailers and distributers adjusted orders to avoid chance 
losses and excess stocks, they did not pay as much attention to manufacturers. Retailers and distributers 
placed their orders with manufacturers by considering stockouts, without much involvement in the 
manufacturer’s determination of the production order. These results show that knowledge sharing 
makes people change their attitudes to the game.  
Statistical Analysis  
Figures 3a–3d are box-plot diagrams, which show the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test between 
the closed and open knowledge-sharing game results for teams and SCs. The data within the two 
correlated samples fail to meet the assumptions of the t-test. Thus, we should adopt the non-parametric 
test of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. All figures show a significant difference (p < 0.01) between the 
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Therefore, there is support for H1, that knowledge sharing between the SC nodes reduces the SC’s BWE. 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the variables contained in our 
model. Table 2 presents the results for testing the three models. The columns in Table 2 for Models I, 
II, and III contain the results associated with three different random-effects logit models.  
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the variables contained in our 
model. Table 2 contains the results for testing the three models. The columns in Table 2 for Models I, 
II, and III contain the results associated with three different random-effects logit models.  
     
Figure 3a. Comparison of knowledge 
-sharing type in team’s total inventory costs 
Figure 3b. Comparison of knowledge-
sharing type in team’s bullwhip effect 
  
Figure 3c. Comparison of knowledge-
sharing type in group’s total inventory costs 
Figure 3d. Comparison of knowledge-
sharing type in group’s bullwhip effect 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01) 
 
Model I includes the control variables, Model II includes all control and independent variables without 
the SC’S BWE variable, and Model II includes all control and independent variables without the SC’S 
total inventory cost variable. Model III is the best model because of the minimization of log likelihood, 
the Akaike Information Criterion, and Bayesian Information Criterion. It is noteworthy that the SC’s 
total inventory cost (Model II) and the SC’s BWE (Model III) belong to different models even though 
their correlation (0.46) is low, because this research considers that SC’s BWE causes an effect similar 
to the SC’s total inventory cost on dependent variables. In fact, the SC’s BWE is significant and 
negatively influences the SC’s total inventory cost; this research places both variables in the same 
models, in which case the SC’s total inventory cost is significant and negative, but the SC’s BWE is not 
significant. 
The results for Models II and III demonstrate that the number of miscalculations about lead time (p 
<.05) are significant and positive predictors of the changing opinions of participants. On the other hand, 
the number of miscalculations about lead time is not significant in Models II and III. Therefore, there 
is support for H2-1, that miscalculation about lead time promotes changes in attitudes about an 
important factor in the SC’s proper inventory of participants’ beliefs in the SCM game. However, there 
is no support for H2-2, that miscalculation about incoming orders promotes changes in attitudes about 
a participants’ beliefs factor in the SC’s proper inventory of participants in the SCM game. 
The strategy existence level is significant (p <.05) and positive only in Model III, and therefore, there is 
partial support for H3-1, that the existence of strategy in the game promotes changes in attitudes about 
an important factor in the SC’s proper inventory of participants’ beliefs in the game. The proposal to 
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redesign the strategy level is significant (p < .10 in II, p < .05 in III), but negative in both models. 
Therefore, there is no support for H3-2, that a proposal to redesign strategy in the SC promotes changes 
in attitudes about an important factor in the SC’s proper inventory of participants’ beliefs in the game. 
The SC’s total inventory cost is significant (p <.01) and negative in Model II, and the SC’s BWE is 
significant (p <.01) and negative in Model III. Therefore, there is support for H4, that reducing the SC’s 
total inventory costs and the BWE promotes changes in attitudes about an important factor in the SC’s 












The purpose of this study is to explore factors of the educational effect of the SCM game through testing 
of our hypotheses. This study focuses on a beneficent influential point in SCM from prior research and 
what effects these points have on SC experts as SCM game players. For the statistical analysis, this study 
uses the game results of a new online SCM game named the “elephant game.” The results show that 
knowledge sharing between SC nodes not only reduces the BWE and total inventory cost but also 
changes the minds of SC experts. In addition, miscalculations of lead time and existence of strategy 
change their minds. 
This research makes three major theoretical contributions regarding the educational effect of the SCM 
game. First, we find important learning factors for SC experts of the SCM game. In the closed 
knowledge-sharing game, players have no information about market demand and order quantities from 
the downstream node. Although this situation makes players feel frustrated, the open knowledge-
sharing game resolves these problems only by talking with all nodes in the same SC. From the result of 
H1, the contrasting of the two types of game promotes understanding of SC and SCM. This is because 
the analysis shows that the open knowledge-sharing game reduces the BWE and inventory costs 
significantly. This is backed up by prior research (e.g., Chen 2003; Lee et al. 2000).  
Second, this research suggests the importance of knowledge sharing between SC nodes by the test of H1, 
H2-1, and H4 through open and closed knowledge-sharing games. Although a lot of prior research 
indicates the importance of information sharing, we propose information sharing using the idea of 
Huber's (1991) organizational memory in knowledge sharing. Based on this idea, the elephant game 
helps understand the importance of knowledge sharing between SC nodes. In addition, this idea 
suggests the difficult problem of organizational learning of the SC because of the two steps in the 
learning level of SC and nodes. Future research needs to reveal the mechanism of the two levels of 
organizational learning using intra and inter-organizational learning theory. In the game, knowledge 
No. Variable Mean S. D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Changing Opinion Dummy 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 1
2 Team Type 2.16 0.79 1.00 3.00 -0.09 1
3 Forge a Convergence of Opinion Level # 1.62 1.00 0.10 3.51 0.00 -0.02 1
4 Interesting Level # 3.23 1.00 0.10 4.27 0.00 0.09 0.20 1
5 Number of  Miscalculation (Lead Time) # 0.93 1.00 0.10 3.55 0.14 -0.14 0.12 -0.12 1
6 Number of  Miscalculation (Incoming Order) 0.99 1.00 0.10 3.35 0.19 -0.17 0.09 -0.07 0.50 1
7 Strtgy Existence Level # 2.09 1.00 0.10 2.90 0.19 0.05 -0.05 0.35 -0.16 0.06 1.00
8 Proposal on Redesign of Strategy Level # 1.12 1.00 0.10 3.27 0.19 -0.13 0.46 0.27 0.16 0.13 0.19 1
9 SC's Total Inventory Cost # 1.22 1.00 0.10 3.27 0.19 0.00 0.08 -0.20 0.19 0.13 -0.52 -0.19 1
10 SC's Bullwhip Effect # 0.55 1.00 0.10 4.27 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.04 -0.31 -0.09 0.46 1
Observations = 114  No. of participants = 57  Standarization variables are marked #
Dependent Variable
No. Variables                                       Model    I    II    III
2 Team Type -0.49 * [ 0.26 ] -0.30 [ 0.37 ] -2.06 [ 2.11 ]
3 Forge a Convergence of Opinion Level # -0.09 [ 0.25 ] 0.42 [ 0.36 ] 3.52 * [ 1.91 ]
4 Interesting Lvl.# -0.14 [ 0.19 ] -0.25 [ 0.31 ] -0.58 [ 1.59 ]
5 Number of  Miscalculation (Lead Time) # 0.81 ** [ 0.39 ] 3.67 ** [ 1.70 ]
6 0.53 [ 0.34 ] 1.56 [ 1.36 ]
7 Strtgy Existence Level # 0.13 [ 0.39 ] 4.78 ** [ 2.22 ]
8 Proposal on Redesign of Strategy Level. # -0.73 * [ 0.40 ] -4.78 ** [ 2.27 ]
9 SC's Total Inventory Cost # -2.27 *** [ 0.66 ]
10 SC's Bullwhip Effect # -146.70 *** [ 54.17 ]
Log likelihood -49.81 -35.21 -32.17
AIC 107.63 88.42 82.35
BIC 118.57 113.04 106.97
Observations 114 114 114
No. of participants 57 57 57
Significance levels: * p < 0.1;  ** p < 0.05;   *** p < 0.01    Standard errors in [   ] 　Standarization variables are marked #
Changing Opinion Dummy
Number of  Miscalculation (Incoming Order) #
Table 2. Results of random-effects logit models 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
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sharing between SC nodes (the open knowledge-sharing game) has precise positive effects for SC 
performance in most cases. However, it is interesting to note there are some cases in which knowledge 
sharing has poor effects, even though players can share broad and deep information and knowledge 
interactively. This strongly suggests the existence of quality of knowledge sharing. 
Third, this research demonstrates the important educational factors of the SCM game for SC experts. 
As H2-1, H3-1, and H4 are supported, miscalculation about lead time, and reduced BWE and inventory 
cost promote changes in the personal perspectives of SCM by SC experts. Notably, BWE has a negative 
effect on changing the ideas of participants, with an extremely small coefficient in Model III compared 
to total inventory cost. Meanwhile, the BWE has a tremendous effect on the personal perspectives of 
SCM by SC experts. In a future SCM game, this result should be considered in the game design phase. 
This research has some practical contributions. First, in spite of the simple game rule and only 20 
minutes of game time, the elephant game can provide players with a realistic experience of BWE and 
the importance of knowledge sharing. These empirical results show the educational benefits of the 
elephant game. The participants’ enjoyment of the elephant game exceeded our expectations based on 
their active discussion and impressions in response to the questionnaires. Although the main advantage 
of the elephant game is its simplicity, because it is too simple to handle even a backlog of orders, 
simplicity is also its main concern when we applied the game to business people for the first time. 
However, our concern proved unfounded. Even though almost all participants (business people) were 
SCM experts, they deeply understood the SC complexity and importance of information sharing while 
they enjoyed the game. With regard to the function of backlog handling, there have been some requests 
to consider this aspect in the research, and we also consider it is necessary from both an educational 
and a research perspective. However, experience of many game instructions has taught us that 
simplicity is important and effective, especially as an introduction to SCM. Since the complexity of SC 
behavior is beyond expectation, both SCM experts and non-experts should play the simple game without 
backlogs at the beginning at least. To promote awareness and understanding of the simple aim of the 
elephant game, considerable parameters must be minimized as much as possible so that we can depend 
on the training level.     
The second practical contribution is that, in addition to providing educational benefits, our game could 
also serve as an important tool in future SC research. We have played the elephant game in two 
university classes over the last 3 years with more than 400 students. From the game results, we realize 
that there is not much difference between students and SC experts. The students’ results are frequently 
better than those of SC experts, because some classes consist of 9 hours of classes in 3 weeks with 
strategic analysis reports and presentation. This means that awareness of strategy for SCM suggests a 
person’s lack of experience in SCs can overcome the SC problem in a simple game setting. 
The third practical contribution of our study is that the researcher can monitor the discussion process 
of SC experts. However, as it is a simulation game, the researcher can also change the goal of the game 
and its conditions, such as information disclosure without talking in the SC for various research 
purposes within a short time. Furthermore, SC data are cross-organizational and are subject to non-
disclosure. Therefore, the elephant game can select the correct simulation data for such research. 
This research has some limitations. First, we need additional game data, because the SC (n = 11) and 
team data (n =31) are not sufficient for multivariable analysis. Second, in order to identify the 
differences between knowledge sharing and information sharing more clearly, we need to add a scenario 
that displays only the amount of orders of all teams on the screen without discussing each team. This 
would not be difficult to undertake, because the elephant game already has a display function for the 
amount of orders of all teams. 
Despite these limitations, by highlighting the role of knowledge sharing in SCM, this study makes a 
significant contribution to the literature of SCM and ICT education. 
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